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No recent trade policy initiative of the United States has gener-
ated as high a degree of public interest and debate as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Beginning in June
1990, when the Presidents of the United States and Mexico an-
nounced their intention to negotiate a free trade agreement,1 through
the extension of fast track negotiating authority2 and signing of a
trinational agreement (also including Canada) in December 1992,'
to this day, a vigorous debate has occurred in the United States
about the benefits and costs of the agreement.
One of the key battlegrounds in this domestic debate has been
the affect of the agreement on U.S. Workers. Certain groups in the
United States have argued that the agreement will have an adverse
effect on U.S. workers.4 As recently as mid-February 1993, the
AFL-CIO Executive Council adopted a resolution characterizing the
agreement as "a disaster for millions of working people in the United
States, Canada and Mexico," and calling for its rejection and
1. Mexico-United States Joint Statement on Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement,
26 WKLY. COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 933 (June 18, 1990).
2. The so-called fast track procedures, which have been used for trade negotiations since
1974, give Congress the assurance of meaningful participation throughout the negotiation of
an agreement and the Administration the guarantee that legislation implementing a trade
agreement will be voted upon within a certain period of time, and without amendments. The
fast track procedures are contained in Sections 1102(d) and 1103 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-418, 19 U.S.C. 2903) and §§ 151-54 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-618, 19 U.S.C. 2191).
3. The agreement was signed on December 17, 1992 in separate ceremonies by President
Bush, President Salinas, and Prime Minister Mulroney. The text of the agreement has been
published as North American Free Trade Agreement, 5 volumes (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1992).
4. Groups opposing NAFTA in the United States have tended to be composed primarily,
although not exclusively, of labor unions. See, e.g., Thomas R. Donahue, Statement before the
Committee on Finance, United States Senate, on the Proposed U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Nego-
tiations (Feb. 6, 1991); William J. Cunningham, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Inter-
national Economic Policy and Trade, and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the North American Free Trade Agreement (Apr. 9, 1991);
AFL-CIO, Exploiting Both Sides (Washington, 1991); and Thomas R. Donahue, The Case
Against a North American Free Trade Agreement, 26 COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus. 92-96
(1991).
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renegotiation.5
Two general concerns regarding the labor implications of the
agreement have dominated the discussions:
" Mutual elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers would
lead to surges in disruptive imports from Mexico and loss of
U.S. jobs; U.S. workers who would be dislocated as a result of
the NAFTA would not have access to adequate services to re-
adjust to new jobs.
" Labor rights, labor standards (including wages), and environ-
mental standards in Mexico either do not exist or their en-
forcement is very lax, thereby keeping production costs in that
country very low. A free trade agreement between the U.S.
and Mexico would lead to the erosion of U.S. labor and envi-
ronmental standards and/or flight of U.S. investment to Mex-
ico to capitalize on the lower labor and environmental stan-
dards there, creating disinvestment and loss of jobs in the
United States.
That these concerns are not trivial is evident by the attention that
they received in the negotiation of the NAFTA and in other actions
being undertaken by the Executive Branch in support of the
agreement.
Part II of the paper focuses on the first of the concerns ex-
pressed about the NAFTA, that it would lead to increases in disrup-
tive imports and job dislocation. It discusses provisions within the
NAFTA to facilitate adjustment and approaches to deal with poten-
tial worker dislocations. Part III examines concerns that have been
expressed about labor standards in Mexico and the public policy re-
sponse to these concerns.
II. The NAFTA and Adjustment Issues
The preponderance of economic studies conducted by academ-
ics, research institutions, and the U.S. Government have suggested
that the NAFTA is likely to have a positive, albeit modest, impact
on the U.S. economy and U.S. employment.6 Nevertheless, the stud-
ies have also recognized that the effect of the agreement is not likely
to be uniform across all sectors of the economy.
Many of the sectors of the U.S. economy identified through eco-
nomic analysis as likely to be adversely affected by a NAFTA are
5. "Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on The North American Free Trade
Agreement," Bal Harbour, Florida (Feb. 17, 1993), p. 1.
6. For a summary of several of the economic impact studies of NAFTA see Gregory
Schoepfle and Jorge Perez-Lopez, U.S. Employment Effects of a North American Free Trade
Agreement: A Survey of Issues and Estimated Employment Effects, Economic Discussion Pa-




labor-intensive and have a history of import sensitivity, particularly
with regard to imports from developing countries. As such, they may
have relatively high tariff protection because they received special
treatment in prior rounds of multilateral tariff-cutting. Reduction or
elimination of these tariffs, if done suddenly, could generate signifi-
cant rises in imports that could injure domestic producers and
workers.
To reduce the likelihood of potential disruptive surges in im-
ports in trade sensitive sectors, while ensuring that the benefits of the
NAFTA accrue to U.S. workers, the United States sought certain
provisions within the NAFTA that would avert injurious worker dis-
locations that might arise as a result of trade liberalization. In addi-
tion, the Administration has expressed a strong commitment to an
effective worker adjustment program that would provide employment
services to workers who might become dislocated as a result of the
implementation of the agreement.
A. Adjustment Provisions Within the NAFTA
Certain provisions within the NAFTA were designed to promote
orderly adjustment to changed trade and investment flows associated
with the implementation of the agreement. These provisions include
transition rules governing the elimination of tariff and nontariff mea-
sures, safeguards, and rules of origin.
1. Transition Rules: To allow concerned industries and
farmers sufficient time to adjust to potential increased competition
from Mexico, the United States sought in the NAFTA a transition
period over which high duties and other barriers on import-sensitive
products would be phased out in small increments. As in the case of
the U.S.-Canada FTA (CFTA), the longest transition would be pro-
vided for those products most sensitive to competition from Mexico.
In exceptional cases, transition periods beyond those provided in the
U.S.-Canada FTA (10 years) would be considered.
7
In the NAFTA, the United States and Mexico agreed to elimi-
nate most tariffs and non-tariff barriers over a ten-year period. The
agreement also provided for long-and extra-long-transition peri-
ods for U.S. tariff reductions to facilitate adjustment in sensitive sec-
tors. Ten-year phase-out periods were negotiated on manufactured
products such as dyes and pigments, some footwear items, ball bear-
ings, bicycles, leather goods, certain chemicals, crude oil, fuels,
men's wool suit coats, and rayon fabrics, and on agricultural prod-
ucts such as certain onions, tomatoes, eggplant, chili peppers,
7. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation
of a North American Free Trade Agreement, mimeographed (May 1, 1991), Tab 2, p. 2.
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squash, and watermelons. A limited number of products were
granted extra-long phase-out periods-up to 15 years. Manufactured
products subject to extra-long tariff phase-out periods include certain
household glassware products, certain footwear products, ceramic
tiles, broomcorn brooms, and certain watches and watch movements,
and agricultural and fisheries items include organge juice, peanuts,
sugar, sprouting broccoli, cucumbers, asparagus, dried onion power,
dried onions, dried garlic, canned tuna, cantaloupes, and other
melons. 8
2. Safeguard Mechamism: To allow the United States to re-
spond effectively and quickly to any injurious increases in industrial
or agricultural imports from Mexico or Canada that might result
from a NAFTA, the United States sought the ability, during a tran-
sition period, to act quickly against imports from Mexico or Canada
if injury to some sector was caused by a tariff reduction agreed to in
the NAFTA. Such a safeguard mechanism would allow the United
States to suspend temporarily preferential tariff reductions agreed
under the NAFTA or reimpose most-favored-nation (MFN) duties.
In addition, the United States sought to include imports from Mex-
ico or Canada in a relief action if imports from those countries were
partly responsible for injury arising from a general import increase.9
Chapter 8 of the NAFTA, titled "Emergency Actions," estab-
lishes a bilateral safeguard mechanism that permits the "snap-back"
to pre-NAFTA or MFN tariff rates for up to three years-or four
years for extremely sensitive products-if increased imports from
Mexico resulting from the elimination of a U.S. tariff constitute a
substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to a U.S. do-
mestic industry. 10
It also allows the imposition of tariffs or quotas on imports from
Mexico and/or Canada as part of a multilateral safeguard action
when imports from either or both countries are a substantial cause of
serious injury, or threat thereof, to a domestic industry. Imports
from NAFTA partners may be excluded from global safeguard ac-
tions, however, based on: (1) a country's ranking among all suppli-
ers; and (2) whether imports from a NAFTA country individually or
from all NAFTA countries collectively contribute importantly to the
8. Report of the Administration on the North American Free Trade Agreement and
Actions Taken in Fulfillment of the May 1, 1991 Commitments, mimeographed (Sept. 18,
1992), at 70-71.
9. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotia-
tion of a North American Free Trade Agreement, mimeographed (May 1, 1991), at 3-4.
10. Article 801.1 of the NAFTA provides that the bilateral safeguard mechanism of the
U.S.-Canada FTA remains in effect regarding potential safeguards on trade between the two




3. Rules of Origin: The United States sought strict rules of
origin in the NAFTA. The rationale for this position was that the
benefits of the NAFTA should flow to products of countries in North
America rather than to those of other countries which were only
slightly processed in North America. In particular, U.S. negotiators
were mindful of the need to craft rules of origin to ensure that Mex-
ico would not become a platform for third-country exports to the
United States.
For the most part, the United States sought to build on the
strong rules of origin in the U.S.-Canada FTA, while recognizing
that some changes might be necessary to meet trade conditions in
Mexico. One specific way in which improvement of the rules of ori-
gin in the U.S.-Canada FTA was sought was to increase the re-
quired North American content under the rule of origin for assem-
bled automotive products. In addition, the United States sought to
eliminate duty "drawback" schemes, whereby manufacturers re-
ceived rebates or waivers of duties paid on imports used in the pro-
duction of products that were exported. Because this practice in ef-
fect turned maquiladoras into export platforms and allowed non-
North American products to pass through to the American market,
the United States sought its termination."
NAFTA clarifies and strengthens the rules of origin contained
in the CFTA. Only North American-made products can obtain the
benefits of the tariff preferences guaranteed under the NAFTA.
Non-NAFTA origin goods must be transformed or processed signifi-
cantly in Mexico before they can receive NAFTA's lower duties
when shipped to the United States. Most rules of origin-specified at
the level of Harmonized System tariff classification-require only a
specified tariff classification change. NAFTA simplifies rule-of-ori-
gin calculations by giving producers a choice of methods (transaction
value method or net cost method) to determine whether a product
qualifies for NAFTA tariff preferences; the calculation underlying
each method is more clearly defined. NAFTA also eliminates cur-
rent practices that distort trade and investment flows in Mexico,
such as export-conditioned duty remission programs.
For automotive products, NAFTA changes the accounting
methodology and explicitly lists eligible costs to provide greater pre-
1 I. Report of the Administration on the North American Free Trade Agreement and
Actions Taken in Fulfillment of the May 1, 1991 Commitments, mimeographed (Sept. 18,
1992), at 71-73.
12. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotia-
tion of a North American Free Trade Agreement, mimeographed (May 1, 1991), Tab 2, at 4-
5.
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dictability for producers. The level of North American content for
passenger vehicles to qualify for NAFTA tariff preferences is 62.5
percent, compared to 50 percent under the CFTA provisions. For
high-technology products, such as computers, semiconductors, and
other electronic components, NAFTA requires that significant com-
ponents be produced in North America, rather than simply assem-
bled here
13
B. Worker Adjustment Assistance
In spite of the above provisions within the NAFTA to promote
its orderly operation, it is nevertheless likely that some U.S. workers
may be adversely affected by the implementation of the agreement.
In a communication sent to the Congress on May 1, 1991, the Bush
Administration indicated it was
firmly committed to a worker adjustment program that is ade-
quately funded and ensures that workers who may lose their jobs
as a result of an FTA with Mexico will receive prompt, compre-
hensive, and effective services. Worker adjustment services,
whether provided through the improvement or expansion of an
existing program or through the creation of a new program,
should be targeted to provide dislocated workers with appropri-
ate services in a timely fashion. 4
The Clinton Administration is similarly committed to providing
adequate support to workers who might be adversely affected by the
NAFTA. In a campaign speech in North Carolina in October 1992,
then-Presidential candidate Clinton expressed his views on the
NAFTA and set forth a number of conditions and qualifications for
his support of the agreement. He stated that his Administration
would provide workers affected by the NAFTA with "[tirade adjust-
ment assistance that includes training, health care benefits and in-
come supports, and assistance to communities to create jobs."' 5 The
Department of Labor is currently working on the design of such a
program.
III. Labor Standards Issues
During the NAFTA debate, concerns were expressed that dis-
parities between labor and environmental standards in the United
13. Report of the Administration on the North American Free Trade Agreement and
Actions Taken in Fulfillment of the May 1, 1991 Commitments, mimeographed (Sept. 18,
1992), at 74-76.
14. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotia-
tion of a North American Free Trade Agreement, mimeographed (May 1, 1991), pp. 6-7.




States and Mexico would lead to the loss of jobs and the erosion of
labor and environmental standards in the United States. Several pro-
visions of the NAFTA, discussed briefly below, recognize these po-
tential problems; the emphasis here is on provisions that deal with
labor standards rather than with environmental standards.
The Bush Administration's primary response to disparities in la-
bor standards between the United States and Mexico was to engage
in a collaborative program with Mexico, on a parallel track to the
NAFTA, aimed at raising labor standards in that country. The Clin-
ton Administration's approach is to deal with deal -with labor stan-
dards issues through supplemental agreements to the NAFTA.
A. Labor Standards Within the NAFTA
Three sections of the NAFTA deal explicitly with labor stan-
dards: the Preamble, Chapter 11 (Investment), and Chapter 9
(Technical Standards).
1. Preamble. The NAFTA's Preamble sets out the principles
and aspirations on which the Agreement is predicated. It pledges all
three signatories to engage in certain forms of conduct, laid out in
the form of resolutions. These resolutions include contributing to
closer political and economic relations, strengthening multilateral in-
stitutions, and engaging in economic development supportive of a
number of societal goals such as the promotion of innovation, protec-
tion of the environment, and conservation of natural resources.
Through these resolutions, the NAFTA signatories set out that their
objective in entering into the Agreement is not promoting the liberal-
ization of trade and investment for its own sake, but rather because
of the positive contribution that it can make to each of their
societies.
Two of the resolutions in the Preamble deal directly with labor
standards. The first states that the governments of the three coun-
tries resolve to "create new employment opportunities and improve
working conditions and living standards in their respective territo-
ries." The wording of this resolution parallels closely that in the Pre-
amble to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which states:
Recognizing that their [the Contracting Parties'] relations in the
field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand ...16
16. Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva: General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, 1986), at 1.
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A second resolution states that the three countries resolve to
"protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights." This resolution
goes to the very heart of the labor standards concerns identified by
NAFTA critics in the United States-the enforcement of labor stan-
dards in Mexico. Significantly, the preambular resolution uses the
term "worker rights," which in U.S. trade jurisprudence goes beyond
the narrower notion of workplace standards ("working conditions" in
the NAFTA preambular resolution discussed above and in the
GATT Preamble) and also includes the more politically-oriented la-
bor standards of freedom of associations and right to organize and
bargain collectively.
17
Although these preambular resolutions are hortatory and not
enforceable, their inclusion recognizes the importance that each
country attributes to labor standards issues in the design and imple-
mentation of the Agreement. Actions by signatories that run counter
to these resolutions could be deemed to be inconsistent with the
objectives (i.e., the intent) of the NAFTA. The Preamble is support-
ive of the ways and means of the parallel process on labor issues in
which the Bush Administration engaged and also of the supplemen-
tal labor standards agreement proposed by President Clinton.
2. Investment. Chapter 11 of the NAFTA removes significant
investment barriers, ensures basic protections for NAFTA investors,
and provides a mechanism for the settlement of disputes between
such investors and a NAFTA country. Pursuant to this Chapter,
each country will treat NAFTA investors and their investments no
less favorably than its own investors (i.e., national treatment) and
investors of other countries (i.e., most-favored-nation treatment).
NAFTA countries may not impose specified "performance require-
17. The U.S. trade and economic statutes that condition U.S. trade benefits or invest-
ment guarantees on the extent to which foreign countries afford their workers certain worker
rights include the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Title 1I, P.L. 98-67; the Genera-
lized System of Preferences Renewal Act, Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, P.L.
98-573; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act, P.L. 99-204; Continu-
ing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, P.L. 100-202 (authorizing funding for the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency); the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L.
100-418; the Andean Trade Preference Act, P.L. 102-182; the legislation making appropria-
tions for foreign appropriations, export financing, and related programs for Fiscal Year 1993,
P.L. 102-391; and the Jobs Through Exports Act of 1992, P.L. 102-549 (authorizing funding
for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation). For commentary on U.S. trade and eco-
nomic legislation incorporating worker rights conditionality see, e.g., Jorge F. Perez-Lopez,
Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law: The U.S. Approach, 9 COMP. LAB. L. J. (1988);
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Worker Rights under the U.S. Trade Laws (New
York: Lawyers Committee, 1989); Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Worker Rights in the U.S. Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act, 41 LAB. L. J. (1990); James M. Zimmerman, The Overseas
Private Investment Corporation and Worker Rights: The Loss of Role Models for Employ-
ment Standards in the Foreign Workplace, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. (1991).
Karen F. Travis, Women in Global Production and Worker Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade
Laws, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 8 (1992); ZIMMERMAN, EXTRATERRITORIAL EMPLOYMENT STAN-
DARDS OF THE UNITED STATES (1992).
[Vol. 11:3
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ments" (specified export levels, minimum domestic content, prefer-
ences for domestic sourcing, trade balancing, technology transfer) in
connection with any investments in its territory. NAFTA also pro-
vides rules guaranteeing the transfer of funds and proceeds of a sale,
setting conditions under which expropriation might occur, and estab-
lishing a detailed mechanism for the resolution of investment dis-
putes involving the breach of the NAFTA investment rules by the
host country.
Article 1114, "Environmental Measures," deals with conflicts
that may arise between efforts of a country to attract investment and
its measures to protect the environment, where environment is de-
fined broadly to include also health and safety standards. Paragraph
2 provides that NAFTA signatories should not lower their domestic
health, safety, or environmental standards in order to attract invest-
ment and that the countries will consult on the observance of this
provision. It states:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage in-
vestment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental
measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from,
such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, ac-
quisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment
of an investor. If a Party considers that another Party has of-
fered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with
the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to
avoiding any such encouragement.
The provision is intended to ban "pollution havens," geographic
locations that allegedly are willing to offer lower environmental stan-
dards as a way to compete for incoming foreign investment. Article
1114 proscribes such practices, broadening the inappropriate conduct
to include possible relaxation of health and safety standards as an
inducement to incoming foreign investment. In the case of disputes,
the countries are called upon to consult with a view to eliminating
the practice.
3. Technical Barriers to Trade. Chapter 9 of the NAFTA, ti-
tled Technical Barriers but generally known as Standards, applies to
standards-related measures, namely standards and governmental
technical regulations and the procedures used to determine that
these standards and regulations are met. It recognizes the crucial
role of standards and regulations in promoting safety and protecting
human, animal and plant life and health, the environment, and con-
sumers. NAFTA signatories have agreed not to use standards-re-
lated measures as unnecessary obstacles to trade, and to cooperate
Spring 1993]
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toward the enhancement and compatibility of such measures within
the continent.
The thrust of the NAFTA is on product-related standards,
since these are the ones that are generally believed to affect trade in
goods and services directly or indirectly. Domestic standards that
regulate the process through which goods and services are produced
(i.e., process-related standards) tend to be out of the scope of the
agreement. For this reason, most labor standards, which tend to per-
tain to work practices and therefore are process related, are not ad-
dressed by NAFTA.
However, there are certain standards-related activities con-
ducted by the U.S. Department of Labor that fall under the purview
of the agreement. The most prominent example is standards issued
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and
the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) requiring ap-
proval or certification of certain devices (e.g., respiratory protective
devices, rubber protective equipment for electrical workers, ladders,
safety footwear, mining equipment) by the U.S. Government or an
accredited laboratory.
The NAFTA does not affect these regulations. It affirms the
right of each signatory to adopt, apply, and enforce standards-re-
lated measures, to choose the level of protection it wishes to achieve
through such measures, and to conduct assessments of risk to ensure
that those levels are achieved. The obligation incurred by each of the
signatories is to ensure that goods or specified services from the other
two countries are treated no less favorably than like goods or services
of national origin, and like goods or services from non-NAFTA
countries.
B. Labor Standards Outside of the NAFTA
The primary response of the United States to deal with labor
standards issues raised by the NAFTA during the Bush Administra-
tion was to engage in discussions and collaborative activities with
Mexico to improve standards in that country. A deliberate policy de-
cision.was made to deal with labor standards in a parallel process to
the NAFTA rather than within the agreement itself. The Clinton
Administration has also sought to address labor standards issues
outside of the NAFTA, through the negotiation of a supplementary
agreement on this subject.
1. Parallel Discussions on Labor Standards: On May 3, 1991,
the Secretaries of Labor of the United States and Mexico signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Regarding Cooperation be-
tween the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and Mexico's Secreta-
[Vol. 11:3
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riat of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsi6n
Social, STPS). The MOU called for cooperative activities in various
areas such as health and safety measures, general working condi-
tions, including labor standards and their enforcement, and resolu-
tion of labor conflicts. At the same time, the two institutions also
agreed to a series of detailed cooperative activities for 1991-92, par-
ticularly in the areas of occupational safety and health, child labor,
and labor statistics. 8
During the first two years of operation of the MOU, the thrust
of cooperative activities was on the development of comparative
studies in the areas of worker safety and health, child labor, labor
law and worker rights, and the informal sector. 19 At the same time,
the United States and Mexico also collaborated on a number of
other concrete activities, foremost in the area of safety and health
(e.g., a tripartite conference on "what works" to prevent accidents in
the iron and steel industry, technical assistance and training to Mex-
ico in developing an improved health enforcement program for its
workforce, exchanges of information on the potential hazards and
uses of specific chemicals), child labor (development of a common
set of goals on child labor), and labor statistics (training courses and
seminars designed to improve the collection and analysis of social
and economic data in Mexico).
2. Supplemental Agreement on Labor Standards: In a major
speech delivered in October 1992, in the midst of the U.S. Presiden-
tial campaign, then-Presidential candidate Clinton spoke at length
about the NAFTA. He stated:
I came here to tell you why I support the North American Free
Trade Agreement. If it is done right, it will create jobs in the
United States and in Mexico, and if it is done right and it is
part of a larger economic strategy, we can raise our incomes and
reverse the awful trend of now more than a decade in which
most Americans are worker harder for less money. If it is not
done right, however, the blessings of the agreement are far less
clear, and the burdens can be significant. I'm convinced that I
18. The MOU and the action plan of cooperative activities are reproduced in Response
of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, mimeographed (May 1, 1991), Tab 3, at 17-19. ff.
19. See U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration and
Mexican Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, A Comparison of Occupational Safety and
Health Programs in the United States and Mexico: An Overview (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1992); U.S. Department of Labor and Mexican Secretariat of Labor and
Social Welfare, A Comparison of Labor Law in the United States and Mexico: An Overview
(Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 1992); Mexican Secretariat of Labor and Social
Welfare, The Informal Sector in Mexico (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 1992); and
U.S. Department of Labor, The Underground Economy in the United States (Washington:
U.S. Department of Labor, 1992).
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will do it right. I am equally convinced that Mr. Bush won't.20
Specifically, he spoke about a number of domestic steps, that would
need to be taken in order to improve the context for the agreement
and three supplemental agreements that should be negotiated with
Canada and Mexico-in the areas of environmental standards, labor
standards, and import surges-to achieve an acceptable package.
Because the North Carolina speech contains President Clinton's
most clearly articulated position on the NAFTA to date, it is used
here as a basis for discussing his Administration's approach to the
Agreement. As the process of negotiations with Mexico and Canada
on the supplemental agreements unfolds, more specificity may be
provided by Administration officials on some of the elements of the
supplemental agreements.21
One of the main themes of then-Presidential Candidate Clin-
ton's assessment of the NAFTA in October 1992 was that the Bush
Administration had not used all available tools outside of the
NAFTA to protect U.S. workers and the environment. He pledged
to "aggressively pursue the remedies available in our current trade
laws and in the proposed agreement to protect our jobs, our busi-
nesses and our environment from unfair practices."22 In addition, he
outlined five unilateral steps that the United States should take to
make the Agreement more acceptable: 1) provide meaningful assis-
tance to domestic workers and communities who are vulnerable to
the NAFTA; 2) protect the environment; 3) provide some assistance
to domestic farmers who are at risk in the NAFTA; 4) public partic-
ipation in the implementation of the NAFTA regarding the environ-
ment; and 5) proper implementation of NAFTA provisions allowing
foreign workers to cross the borders and enter the United States.
In addition to the five domestic actions listed above, he sketched
the contents of a trinational (United States, Canada, and Mexico):
(1) establishment of a trinational commission on labor matters; and
(2) a trinational agreement to ensure that each country enforces its
own labor standards.
3. Trinational Commission: The trinational commission on
worker standards and safety should have extensive powers to edu-
cate, train, develop minimum standards, and have dispute resolution
powers and the ability to provide remedies. The powers of the com-
mission would be similar to those of the environmental commission:
20, President Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs (Oct. 4,
1992).
21. See, e.g., Ambassador Mickey Kantor, Testimony before the Senate Committee on
Finance (Mar. 9, 1993).




The commission should also encourage the enforcement of the
country's own environmental laws through education, training,
and commitment of resources, and provide a forum to hear com-
plaints. Such commission would have the power to provide reme-
dies, including money damages and the legal power to stop pol-
lution. As a last report, a country could even be allowed to
withdraw.
4. Enforcement of Domestic Laws: There should also be a
trinational agreement requiring each country to enforce its own envi-
ronmental and worker standards. Candidate Clinton stated that the
agreement should
contain a wide variety of procedural safeguards and remedies
that we take for granted here in our country, such as easy access
to the courts, public hearings, the right to present evidence,
streamlined procedures and effective remedies. I will negotiate
an agreement among the three parties that permits citizens of
each country to bring suit in their own courts when they believe
their domestic environmental protections and worker standards
aren't being enforced.
IV. Concluding Observations
Speaking at American University in February 1993, President
Clinton amplified his views on NAFTA, stressing the labor implica-
tions of the agreement:
The North American Free Trade Agreement . . . began as an
agreement with Canada, which I strongly supported, which has
now led to a pact with Mexico as well. That agreement holds the
potential to create many, many jobs in America over the next
decade if it is joined with others to ensure that the environment,
that living standards, that working conditions, are honored-
that we can literally know that we are going to raise the condi-
tion of people in America and in Mexico. We have a vested in-
terest in a wealthier, stronger Mexico, but we need to do it on
terms that are good for our people .
8
Ambassador Mickey Kantor has indicated that the negotiations with
Mexico and Canada on the supplemental agreement on labor stan-
dards will begin on March 17 and that the Administration will not
ask for Congress to vote on legislation implementing the NAFTA
until the negotiations "result in comprehensive, enforceable agree-
ments."2 Given the important role that labor issues have played
23. President Bill Clinton, Remarks by the President at American University Centennial
Celebration (Feb. 26, 1993).
24: Ambassador Mickey Kantor, Testimony, before the Senate Committee on Finance
(March 9, 1993).
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throughout the NAFTA negotiations, it is perhaps fitting that the
final episode of the agreement will again revolve around them.
